Axxe55
Retiretgtshit stirrer
One was posted to YT a couple of months ago, and the other earlier today sometime.
I merely posted them as being possibly relevant to the thread topic, and as an update.
SCOTUS 2A Victory: NYSRA v Bruen
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I merely posted them as being possibly relevant to the thread topic, and as an update.
Justice Thomas wrote it (may he serve on the bench for decades to come!), 6-3.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinion...0-843_7j80.pdf
Thomas says in the intro that the court is holding "that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual's right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.
The New York "proper cause" requirement violates the Constitution, Thomas explains, because it only allows public-carry licenses when an applicant shows a special need for self-defense.
Run any gun control law through this filter:
(1) Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have devel-
oped a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment chal-
lenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny. The Court re-
jects that two-part approach as having one step too many. Step one is
broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Sec-
ond Amendment’s text, as informed by history. But Heller and McDon-
ald do not support a second step that applies means-end scrutiny in
the Second Amendment context. Heller’s methodology centered on
constitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test
such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any
interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny.
One of the most important 2A decisions of our lives, and look who signed on:
GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT
every single Trump appointee, imagine that. Voting matters, people. Elections have consequences. Get off your arse and vote, every single time (unless you are a democrat, in which case please don't ever vote)
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinion...0-843_7j80.pdf
Thomas says in the intro that the court is holding "that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual's right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.
The New York "proper cause" requirement violates the Constitution, Thomas explains, because it only allows public-carry licenses when an applicant shows a special need for self-defense.
Run any gun control law through this filter:
(1) Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have devel-
oped a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment chal-
lenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny. The Court re-
jects that two-part approach as having one step too many. Step one is
broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Sec-
ond Amendment’s text, as informed by history. But Heller and McDon-
ald do not support a second step that applies means-end scrutiny in
the Second Amendment context. Heller’s methodology centered on
constitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test
such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any
interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny.
One of the most important 2A decisions of our lives, and look who signed on:
GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT
every single Trump appointee, imagine that. Voting matters, people. Elections have consequences. Get off your arse and vote, every single time (unless you are a democrat, in which case please don't ever vote)
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The court rejects the "two-part" approach used by the courts of appeals in Second Amendment cases. "In keeping with Heller," Thomas writes, "we hold that when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct."
THUS IS HUGE!!!!
THUS IS HUGE!!!!
Last edited:
Held: New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. Pp. 8–63.
(a)
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, the Court held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Under Heller, when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct, and to justify a firearm regulation the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’shistorical tradition of firearm regulation. Pp. 8–22.
(1)
Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have developed a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny. The Court rejects that two-part approach as having one step too many. Step one isbroadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history. But Heller and McDonald do not support a second step that applies means-end scrutiny inthe Second Amendment context. Heller’s methodology centered onconstitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 9–15.
(2)
Historical analysis can sometimes be difficult and nuanced, but reliance on history to inform the meaning of constitutional text ismore legitimate, and more administrable, than asking judges to “makedifficult empirical judgments” about “the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions,” especially given their “lack [of] expertise” in the field. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion). Federal courts tasked with making difficult empirical judgments regarding firearmregulations under the banner of “intermediate scrutiny” often defer to the determinations of legislatures. While judicial deference to legislative interest balancing is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropriate—it is not deference that the Constitution demands here. The Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people,” and it “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms” for self-defense. Heller, 554 U. S., at 635. Pp. 15–17.
(3)
The test that the Court set forth in Heller and applies todayrequires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding. Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms todayare not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution
can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the understandings of those who ratified it. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–405. Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller at least one way in which the Second Amendment’s historically fixedmeaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.” 554 U. S., at 582.
To determine whether a firearm regulation is consistent with the Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald point toward at least tworelevant metrics: first, whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense, and second, whether that regulatory burden is comparably justified. Because “individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right,” these two metrics are “ ‘central’ ” considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599).
To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster. For example, courts can use analogies to “longstanding” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” to determine whether modernregulations are constitutionally permissible. Id., at 626. That said, respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause requirement as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the New York City Police Department. Pp. 17–22.
(b)
Having made the constitutional standard endorsed in Heller more explicit, the Court applies that standard to New York’s proper-cause requirement. Pp. 23–62.
(1)
It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580. And no party disputes that handguns are weapons “in common use” today for self-defense. See id., at 627. The Court has little difficulty concludingalso that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch’s andNash’s proposed course of conduct—carrying handguns publicly for self-defense. Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and beararms, and the definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry.Moreover, the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” id., at 592, and confrontation can surely take place outside the home. Pp. 23–24.
(a)
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, the Court held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Under Heller, when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct, and to justify a firearm regulation the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’shistorical tradition of firearm regulation. Pp. 8–22.
(1)
Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have developed a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny. The Court rejects that two-part approach as having one step too many. Step one isbroadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history. But Heller and McDonald do not support a second step that applies means-end scrutiny inthe Second Amendment context. Heller’s methodology centered onconstitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 9–15.
(2)
Historical analysis can sometimes be difficult and nuanced, but reliance on history to inform the meaning of constitutional text ismore legitimate, and more administrable, than asking judges to “makedifficult empirical judgments” about “the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions,” especially given their “lack [of] expertise” in the field. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion). Federal courts tasked with making difficult empirical judgments regarding firearmregulations under the banner of “intermediate scrutiny” often defer to the determinations of legislatures. While judicial deference to legislative interest balancing is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropriate—it is not deference that the Constitution demands here. The Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people,” and it “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms” for self-defense. Heller, 554 U. S., at 635. Pp. 15–17.
(3)
The test that the Court set forth in Heller and applies todayrequires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding. Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms todayare not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution
can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the understandings of those who ratified it. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–405. Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller at least one way in which the Second Amendment’s historically fixedmeaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.” 554 U. S., at 582.
To determine whether a firearm regulation is consistent with the Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald point toward at least tworelevant metrics: first, whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense, and second, whether that regulatory burden is comparably justified. Because “individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right,” these two metrics are “ ‘central’ ” considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599).
To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster. For example, courts can use analogies to “longstanding” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” to determine whether modernregulations are constitutionally permissible. Id., at 626. That said, respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause requirement as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the New York City Police Department. Pp. 17–22.
(b)
Having made the constitutional standard endorsed in Heller more explicit, the Court applies that standard to New York’s proper-cause requirement. Pp. 23–62.
(1)
It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580. And no party disputes that handguns are weapons “in common use” today for self-defense. See id., at 627. The Court has little difficulty concludingalso that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch’s andNash’s proposed course of conduct—carrying handguns publicly for self-defense. Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and beararms, and the definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry.Moreover, the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” id., at 592, and confrontation can surely take place outside the home. Pp. 23–24.
Some early thoughts, in between peals of joyous laughter:
the USA is not Constitutional Carry:
"The states, including New York, that had used proper cause requirements "may continue to require licenses for carrying handguns for self-defense so long as those States employ objective licensing requirements like those used by the 43 shall-issue States."
So every state is "shall-issue", but anti-2A states are just gearing up to make life a hassle for their citizens. Stay tuned for the abuses. The decision is ready for this: because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry.
Nationwide reciprocity is something you can expect from the next R-controlled Congress. Write Cruz and Cornhole now, and demand they get to work on this. Tell Cornhole it's how he can make amends for his gun control sins (and then we vote him out anyways).
There will be a pile of 2A victories across the nation that were in holding patterns awaiting this decision.
There will be some bumps. For example, the decision will allow states to regulate the manner of carry. Meaning, NY can say, "OK, you can have a carry permit, but you have to open carry. If your gun becomes concealed, you are a felon". You'll still have to know the laws in individual, anti-2A states!
the USA is not Constitutional Carry:
"The states, including New York, that had used proper cause requirements "may continue to require licenses for carrying handguns for self-defense so long as those States employ objective licensing requirements like those used by the 43 shall-issue States."
So every state is "shall-issue", but anti-2A states are just gearing up to make life a hassle for their citizens. Stay tuned for the abuses. The decision is ready for this: because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry.
Nationwide reciprocity is something you can expect from the next R-controlled Congress. Write Cruz and Cornhole now, and demand they get to work on this. Tell Cornhole it's how he can make amends for his gun control sins (and then we vote him out anyways).
There will be a pile of 2A victories across the nation that were in holding patterns awaiting this decision.
There will be some bumps. For example, the decision will allow states to regulate the manner of carry. Meaning, NY can say, "OK, you can have a carry permit, but you have to open carry. If your gun becomes concealed, you are a felon". You'll still have to know the laws in individual, anti-2A states!
A few highlights:
Second Amendment’s historically fixed meaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.” 554 U. S., at 582.
Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have developed a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny. The Court rejects that two-part approach as having one step too many.
Heller’s methodology centered on constitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny.
While judicial deference to legislative interest balancing is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropriate—it is not deference that the Constitution demands here. The Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people,” and it “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms” for self-defense.
Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms today are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the understandings of those who ratified it.
Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller at least one way in which the Second Amendment’s historically fixed meaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.”
It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580.
Second Amendment’s historically fixed meaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.” 554 U. S., at 582.
Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have developed a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny. The Court rejects that two-part approach as having one step too many.
Heller’s methodology centered on constitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny.
While judicial deference to legislative interest balancing is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropriate—it is not deference that the Constitution demands here. The Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people,” and it “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms” for self-defense.
Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms today are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the understandings of those who ratified it.
Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller at least one way in which the Second Amendment’s historically fixed meaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.”
It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580.
God Bless Clarence Thomas.
..and f*ck John Cornyn.
This ruling is an absolute game changer.
“Today’s ruling is a watershed win for good men and women all across America and is the result of a decades-long fight the NRA has led,” said Wayne LaPierre, executive vice president of the National Rifle Association. “The right to self-defense and to defend your family and loved ones should not end at your home. This ruling brings life-saving justice to law-abiding Americans who have lived under unconstitutional regimes all across our country, particularly in cities and states with revolving door criminal justice systems, no cash bail and increased harassment of law-enforcement. ”
The 6-3 decision, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen, marks the widest expansion of gun rights since 2010, when the court applied nationwide a 2008 ruling establishing an individual right of armed self-defense within the home. It puts in question similar laws in at least eight other states and the District of Columbia, where authorities hold substantial discretion over issuing concealed-weapons permits.
New York City Mayor Eric Adams, a former police captain, said it would make policing more difficult if more people were allowed to carry guns. “This is not the wild, wild West,” he said earlier this month.
Idiot. We heard these same fear mongering statements in Texas for concealed carry, open carry, constitutional carry. And they were completely wrong.
Idiot. We heard these same fear mongering statements in Texas for concealed carry, open carry, constitutional carry. And they were completely wrong.
.govs already allow criminals to carry guns, so I don’t know how policing law abiding citizens is going to be harder.
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